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Abstract
In most societies, resources are distributed by individuals acting in markets and by governments through some form of 
collective decision-making process. Economic evaluation offers a set of tools to inform collective decisions by examin-
ing the resource requirements and outcomes of alternative policies. The ‘societal perspective’ has been advocated, but 
less consideration has been given to what this should include and its practical implementation. This paper presents a 
framework for economic evaluation of policies with costs and outcomes falling on different sectors (e.g. health, criminal 
justice, education) and involving different decision makers. It extends the ‘impact inventory’ developed by the Second 
Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine by considering all affected individuals and reflecting how outcomes 
attributed to an intervention can be compared with outcomes forgone as a result of resources not being available for 
other purposes. The framework sets out the series of assessments to be made, distinguishing points at which value judge-
ments feed into the evaluation, and the implications of alternative judgements. These assessments reflect the institutional 
arrangements of public bodies, for example, their funding, the outcomes they consider important and their relative valu-
ations of these outcomes. By avoiding the use of an abstract ‘societal perspective’, the contribution of the framework is 
to inform multiple decision makers with different objectives and provide practical guidance on overall societal impact.
Key Points for Decision Makers 
The ‘societal perspective’ has been advocated, but less 
consideration has been given to what this should include 
and its practical implementation.
This paper presents a framework that can inform multi-
ple decision makers.
The framework sets out the assessments to be made and 
distinguishes points at which value judgements feed into 
the evaluation.
1 Introduction
In the context of a free market, individuals are the decision 
makers who determine their own resource allocation. How-
ever, in most societies, a proportion of available resources is 
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allocated by the government through some form of collective 
decision-making process [1–3]. The entities of the govern-
ment, each with a focus on a particular part of the public 
sector, for example, health, education and criminal justice 
ministries, therefore, represent another set of decision mak-
ers who determine the allocation of collective resources [4]. 
The government also provides a mechanism for constrain-
ing the choice set of individuals [1]. Thus, resource alloca-
tion is accomplished through a mix of market forces and 
the agency of the government [1–3]. Institutional arrange-
ments constrain the choice set, and, subject to these, social 
choices must be made involving the allocation of collective 
resources for the provision of goods and services in the pub-
lic sector [2].
The methods of economic evaluation have developed 
to inform collective decisions by examining the resource 
requirements and outcomes of alternative policies or inter-
ventions [5]. Identifying policies that could have social value 
involves a series of questions of value and of fact.1 Norma-
tive questions of value determine the outcomes relevant to 
inform a decision, their relative worth, and judgements about 
their desired distribution in the population. Key normative 
judgements needed ex ante include defining the outcomes 
that will influence the choices made by decision makers. 
Subsequently, economic evaluation can proceed as a fac-
tual (empirical) account regarding what would change if 
resources were allocated to that intervention instead of alter-
native options. The introduction of a new healthcare inter-
vention that is more costly than current practice results in 
opportunity costs. In the case of fixed budgets, these take the 
form of the benefits of displaced activities that can no longer 
be funded. When budgets are more flexible, opportunity 
costs relate to the benefits associated with the broader set of 
activities to which the resources could have been devoted. 
In other words, the opportunity costs of new interventions 
relate to other activities within a sector unless budgets are 
increased to fund more costly activities. Even when budgets 
adjust immediately, opportunity costs exist somewhere as 
the resources could have been used for other purposes [6].
Hence, the changes in outcomes attributed to the new 
intervention must be compared with those opportunity 
costs. Once the outcomes that are gained and forgone are 
estimated, normative judgements about their relative worth 
and desired distribution across individuals may be crucial 
to inform trade-offs and resource-allocation decisions, for 
example, when some individuals gain and others lose.
For some interventions (e.g. some medical technolo-
gies), the majority of impacts fall on one sector (e.g. the 
healthcare sector), and the minor, wider effects are often 
assumed unimportant and excluded from the scope of the 
evaluation. However, many interventions have important 
effects on costs and outcomes that fall across the private 
and public sectors or between different entities within those 
sectors. Here resource-allocation decisions that reflect the 
full range of effects may need input from multiple deci-
sion makers who may have different objectives and remits. 
For example, an intervention may include decision-maker 
involvement from both healthcare and education sectors. 
Similar issues arise when considering the need for coordi-
nation between different levels of decision makers within a 
sector, such as at national and local levels. To evaluate such 
interventions, the use of a catch-all ‘societal’ perspective 
for economic evaluation has often been advocated, whereby 
all costs and outcomes are reflected [7–9]. However, many 
studies do not take a societal perspective, and even those that 
state they do omit potentially important costs and outcomes 
[10–14]. Even when a societal perspective is undertaken that 
captures all costs and outcomes, it is unclear how the sum-
mary information produced by such an approach informs 
choices across different settings and decision makers [15]. 
Different objectives may lead to different judgements about 
what outcomes are relevant and their relative values. The 
low proportion of studies that even attempt to incorporate a 
wider perspective may be a consequence of these challenges 
[11]. However, use of a narrow perspective tailored to one 
decision maker risks omitting important outcomes for other 
decision makers.
The framework proposed in this paper describes how eco-
nomic evaluation can inform multiple, heterogeneous deci-
sion makers and provide guidance for an overall societal 
perspective, which has been missing in the economic evalu-
ation literature. To do so, it clearly distinguishes the points 
at which value judgements feed into the evaluation and the 
implications of alternative judgements with respect to the 
final results. The logic applies to a range of settings, includ-
ing where budgets and resource-allocation decisions are 
determined simultaneously and/or where different decision 
makers are seen as having different objectives and remits.
The paper expands on the ‘impact inventory’ of the Sec-
ond Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine 
[10] to capture the impact of an intervention on individuals 
from a set of outcomes or dimensions of interest determined 
by value judgements and institutional arrangements of the 
decision makers to be informed. The inventory catalogues 
the impacts on these outcomes in terms of both the direct 
effects and the opportunity costs and forces the analyst to 
set out explicitly what outcomes and sectors are included 
in their analysis. Alternative approaches for aggregat-
ing the impacts are then considered. Using a case study 
from the Second Panel, a series of assessments is set out 
for evaluating an intervention involving a range of public 
1 By fact here, we refer to things that can be empirically estimated, 
and while estimation is subject to uncertainty, the true values are at 
least potentially knowable and, therefore, we define these as factual.
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sector decision makers contingent on institutional arrange-
ments. The approach is then compared with that proposed 
by the Second Panel to expose the implicit judgements and 
potential weaknesses in their societal perspective approach. 
Finally, a general discussion is presented of the economic 
theory and underpinning value judgements that support dif-
ferent approaches, and the role for economic evaluation.
2  Extended impact inventory framework 
for economic evaluation
Economic evaluation of interventions generally starts from 
impacts on individuals, which could be through changes in 
any number of dimensions relevant to them (e.g. impacts 
intrinsic to the individual, such as aspects of human capital 
[health, education], their capabilities or changes to com-
modities they consume). In the impact inventory’s purest 
form, all possible dimensions could be included, each cap-
tured in natural units which include no intrinsic value judge-
ments. However, in practice, it is unlikely to be possible to 
be exhaustive in this selection process, and the choice of the 
dimensions to be included is a normative judgement. Each 
public sector decision maker will have in mind their objec-
tives and the key issues of consequence when assessing the 
value of an intervention. To inform decisions appropriately, 
the dimensions in the impact inventory should reflect the 
key issues of consequence for any decision makers it seeks 
to inform, for example, healthcare decision makers may be 
interested in the health of individuals. In some instances, the 
decision maker’s objective will not align with an obvious 
measure, in which case their preferred choice of constructed 
or proxy measure can be elicited. The identification of the 
relevant dimensions is considered further in Sect. 3.
Once the dimensions are defined, the evaluation starts by 
measuring the changes in these dimensions for each indi-
vidual potentially affected (i.e. those whose dimensions 
are expected to change as a result of the introduction of 
an intervention). For this there are two parts: (1) the direct 
effects of the intervention and (2) the opportunity costs in 
terms of what individuals would otherwise achieve from the 
alternative use of the resources (what is forgone). The abso-
lute level of a dimension may also be important (e.g. as a 
result of equity concerns or diminishing marginal impact), 
in which case the impact inventory can also include the cur-
rent allocation. Populating each cell of the inventory is a 
question of fact: in principle, knowable from evidence for 
each individual and dimension.
Figure 1 represents a generic impact inventory with x 
dimensions (D) and n individuals (P) in terms of current 
allocations (CA), direct effects (DE), opportunity costs (OC) 
and net effects ( Δ).2 
If the new intervention is introduced, individual  Pi would 
gain  DEij in dimension  Dj directly. However, if the interven-
tion had not been introduced, they would have gained  OCij, 
from the alternative (which is not funded given the introduc-
tion of the intervention). The net effect on each dimension, 
Δij , is the difference between the direct effect and the oppor-
tunity cost (e.g. Δij = DEij − OCij ). Assuming all dimensions 
are characterised as ‘positives’, i.e. more is better for all 
individuals, then where the new intervention leads to a net 
gain in at least one dimension for one individual and no net 
losses in any dimension for any individual, this interven-
tion could be described as beneficial (no-one is worse off 
and at least one individual is better off). However, in most 
cases, there will be gains and losses both within individu-
als (i.e. some dimensions improve while other worsen) and 
between individuals (i.e. some individuals will gain overall, 
and others will lose). Therefore, to judge whether introduc-
ing an intervention leads to a net gain overall, methods for 
aggregating across dimensions and individuals are required.
There are two general aggregation approaches: (1) a 
within-individual approach (to aggregate first within indi-
viduals across all dimensions, and then to aggregate across 
individuals) or alternatively (2) a within-dimension approach 
Fig. 1  Impact inventory 
reflecting the direct effects and 
opportunity costs across all 
dimensions for each individual. 
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(to aggregate first across individuals for each dimension, and 
then to aggregate across dimensions at the population level).
2.1  A Within‑Individual Approach
To implement a within-individual approach, a benefit func-
tion must be specified to aggregate across dimensions for 
each individual. Many specifications are possible, each func-
tional form (F) representing a normative judgement on how 
dimensions are valued at the individual level. A common 
function could be based on a representative individual (i.e. F 
is assumed the same across all individuals) or multiple func-
tions could account for heterogeneity across individuals, e.g. 
as a result of differences in preferences (Fi). For example, 
a common aggregate function could be based on relative 
values at the margin as determined by market prices.3 An 
alternative would be to aggregate dimensions based on rela-
tive valuations elicited from a sample of the public, relevant 
decision makers or other relevant experts. The person-level 
(P) net benefit function for each individual (i) can be gener-
ally specified as:
This represents the net benefit of the intervention to the 
individual, that is, the benefit to the individual from the 
intervention being introduced less the benefit to the indi-
vidual if it had not been introduced. The inclusion of the 
current allocation of each dimension captures only the value 
of the allocation for the individual, not the interpersonal or 
distributional value across individuals (i.e. it does not allow 
for valuing the outcomes of other individuals in this simple 
case). With a function specified, evidence of the impact of an 
intervention can be aggregated, which allows estimation of 
the overall net benefit to each individual of the intervention.
(1)NBPi = Fi
(
Δ
i1, CAi1,… ,Δix, CAix
)
If the intervention results in a negative net benefit for any 
individual (and positive for others), an overall population 
net benefit function is required that aggregates across each 
individual. As with the individual net benefit function, many 
specifications are possible, reflecting normative judgements 
about how the impacts on different individuals are valued. 
For example, all individuals could be valued equally and the 
individual net benefit functions simply summed. Alterna-
tively, other concerns could be incorporated, such as equity, 
with individuals receiving weights determined by equity-
relevant characteristics such as their overall benefit.
The net benefit function across individuals can be gener-
ally specified as:
where SWI denotes that the net benefit function is at a 
societal level (S) and based on a within-individual (WI) 
approach. Figure 2 shows an impact inventory for a within 
individual approach.
2.2  A Within‑Dimension Approach
The within-dimension approach first aggregates the impact 
on each dimension across individuals by specification of a 
benefit function at the dimension level. Again, many func-
tional forms are possible, representing alternative normative 
judgements. For example, it may be desirable to sum the 
unweighted changes in dimensions across individuals, or 
the changes could be weighted by their current allocations 
because of diminishing returns or equity concerns. Alterna-
tively, the function could be based on dominance, so that a 
net benefit will only occur if no individual is made worse 
off and at least one is made better off. It is not the role of the 
analyst to define the aggregation function; it should reflect 
the value judgements of the decision maker(s) involved.
The general form for the net benefit function for dimen-
sion j is:
(2)NBSWI = S
(
NB
P1,… , NBPn
)
,
(3)NBDj = Sj
(
Δ1j, CA1j,… ,Δnj, CAnj
)
.
Fig. 2  Impact inventory for a 
within-individual approach. The 
information required to populate 
individual 1’s net benefit func-
tion is highlighted in bold and 
the information required to pop-
ulate the population net benefit 
function is shown in the shaded 
right-hand column. CA current 
allocation, Dj dimension j, DE 
direct effect, Pi individual or 
group i, OC opportunity cost, ∆ 
net effect
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3 Market prices may reflect individuals’ willingness to pay for a unit 
of outcome in each dimension at the margin, but in the case of market 
failure and for things that are not bought and sold, it would be neces-
sary to calculate shadow prices. Shadow prices reflect the best esti-
mate of a price of a good if it were to be traded in a market with no 
market failures (e.g. using contingent valuation methods).
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This represents the net benefit on the dimension (i.e. 
the benefit on the dimension from the intervention being 
introduced less the opportunity cost on that dimension). 
Unless an intervention generates a net benefit, or at least 
no loss, for every dimension, an overall population net 
benefit function is required to aggregate across each 
dimension so that the relative value of each dimension 
can be considered.
The net benefit function across dimensions can be gen-
erally specified as:
where SWD denotes that the net benefit function is at a 
societal level (S) and based on a within-dimension (WD) 
approach. Figure 3 shows an impact inventory for a within-
dimension approach.
2.3  Further Considerations
In the simplest case, whereby the functions are linear and 
additive (and with common parameters), the within-indi-
vidual and within-dimension approaches have the same 
results. However, where the functions are non-linear, the 
overall net benefit of an intervention will differ, not only 
according to the net benefit functional form but also accord-
ing to the ordering by which individuals and dimensions 
are aggregated. Therefore, careful consideration should be 
given to the appropriateness of the approach chosen given 
the requirements of the decision makers being informed.
Individuals’ current allocations may be important in 
either approach. There may be diminishing returns such that 
the benefit received, for example, from each additional year 
of life, might diminish; or there may be equity concerns, 
such as a greater social value being placed on outcomes to 
individuals who have relatively less compared with those 
who have relatively more. The inclusion of current alloca-
tions and other individual characteristics will increase the 
informational requirements to populate the inventory and 
(4)NBSWD = F
(
NB1,… , NBx
)
,
the complexity of the functional form of the net benefit 
functions.
A further issue is the independence of the different dimen-
sions. For example, where decision makers’ objective(s) do 
not align with an obvious natural unit such that a constructed 
or proxy measure is used, it is possible that different dimen-
sions in the inventory may not be conceptually independent, i.e. 
they could capture some of the same benefits. For example, the 
quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), widely used in the economic 
evaluation of health, has significant overlap with the ASCOT 
measure, which is used to evaluate social care interventions 
[16]. In such cases, there is a risk of double counting, which 
analysts may seek to mitigate through either the choice of the 
dimensions or with adjustments to the net benefit functions. If 
dimensions are not independent because statistical or causal 
relationships exist, then this may invalidate some aggregation 
approaches.
It may not be possible, or desirable, to express explicit aggre-
gation functions if there are competing views of what deter-
mines social value. Where an explicit, complete and coherent 
view of what determines social value is not possible, the analyst 
can present alternative values and show the thresholds at which 
decisions will change. For example, it may be possible to iden-
tify the minimal set of value judgements required to establish 
positive overall benefit. Similar approaches have been used in 
distributional cost-effectiveness analysis when considering 
interventions where there are conflicting effects on effective-
ness and equity [17]. The steps for developing and implement-
ing the framework are shown in Fig. 4.
3  Implementing the Impact Inventory 
for Decisions Involving the Public 
and Private Sectors
This section considers how the impact inventory could be 
implemented to inform different decision makers in both 
the public and the private sectors. It reflects institutional 
Fig. 3  Impact inventory for a 
within-dimension approach. The 
information required to populate 
dimension 1’s net benefit func-
tion is highlighted in bold and 
the information required for the 
population net benefit function 
is shown in the shaded bottom 
row. CA current allocation, Dj 
dimension j, DE direct effect, 
NBDj net benefit dimension j, 
OC opportunity cost, Pi indi-
vidual or group i, ∆ net effect
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arrangements common in many countries, evaluative 
approaches already taken to inform decisions and typically 
available evidence. In this illustration, the common insti-
tutional arrangements are presumed whereby budgets are 
determined separately from decisions about the funding of 
particular interventions and services and reflect a political 
process rather than an explicit consideration of individual 
preferences. We also assume resource-allocation decisions 
may be needed from multiple decision makers who may have 
different objectives reflecting their roles and remits. Given 
these institutional arrangements, a within-dimension aggre-
gation approach may be most suitable because a within-indi-
vidual approach would require all decision makers involved 
to agree to aggregation functions that value all dimensions 
(beyond those within their remit). A case study evaluating 
treatments for individuals with alcohol use disorders (AUDs) 
from the Second Panel is used to demonstrate the impact 
inventory [10]. Further worked numerical examples are also 
provided in Appendix A1 in the Electronic Supplementary 
Material (ESM), and algebraic notation for the impact inven-
tory is provided in Appendix A2 in the ESM.
Using healthcare as an example, the following are con-
sidered: (1) the choice of dimensions of interest, (2) how 
opportunity costs can be estimated and (3) the appropri-
ate methods for aggregating outcomes to assess value. The 
application is then expanded beyond healthcare to also con-
sider impacts on individuals’ private consumption. Finally, 
an intervention is considered that also impacts upon a second 
sector, criminal justice, and involves two decision makers.
3.1  Institutional Arrangements, Outcomes 
of Interest and Opportunity Costs
Within government, responsibility for resource allocation is 
typically apportioned between departments, each focusing 
on a particular sector of the economy, and with a budget 
exogenously allocated by a central decision-making process 
(e.g. a finance ministry), resulting in a set of distinct agen-
cies differentiated by their remit [18, 19]. The remit of each 
department is often broad, with multiple objectives, and 
within each department there may be further apportioning of 
roles and responsibilities resulting in multiple tiers of princi-
pal agent relationships [4]. Typically, departmental decision 
makers have objectives against which they are judged, some 
of which may be explicit and clearly defined and others that 
may be less transparent.
Consideration of the objectives of decision makers can 
help define the dimensions to be included in the impact 
inventory. The objectives by their nature should direct the 
focus towards outcomes of value. Matching the dimen-
sions to the objectives, therefore, aligns the consideration 
of impacts on individuals with the interests of the relevant 
decision maker(s).
3.2  The Healthcare Sector and a Single Decision 
Maker
Healthcare bodies often state the improvement of popula-
tion health as a key objective [20]. A generic measure of 
outcome that can be applied across all diseases is preferable 
for analysis to support resource-allocation decisions. This is 
because it allows for direct comparison of all direct effects 
(e.g. health benefits and side effects) with opportunity cost 
Fig. 4  The steps necessary to 
develop and implement the 
framework based on the impact 
inventory
3. Aggregang the eﬀects
What are the relave values of 
dimensions?
What are the relave values of 
individuals?
2. Populang the impact inventory
What are the direct eﬀects? What are the opportunity costs?
1. Deﬁning the scope of the impact inventory
What are the relevant dimensions? Who are the individuals aﬀected?
Striving for a Societal Perspective: A Framework for Economic Evaluations
for a given intervention and facilitates consistency in deci-
sions across disease areas. Many different measures of health 
are possible. The dimensions in the inventory could poten-
tially consist of length of life and a description of the health 
states experienced using a multi-attribute description system 
such as the EuroQol 5D questionnaire [21]. However, given 
the existence of pre-specified generic measures for health, 
one of the common summary measures that integrates qual-
ity and quantity of life lived may be considered an accept-
able dimension in its own right, even though it incorporates 
specific value judgements into the impact inventory. In the 
UK, for example, the QALY is the preferred generic health 
outcome [22, 23]4 and this has also been reflected in the 
USA [10].
Other outcomes may be important in healthcare beyond 
improving health, for example, access to healthcare, patient 
experience and equity [24]. Where it is not feasible to reflect 
all dimensions that could be considered important—for 
example, for reasons of time constraints or availability of 
evidence—decision makers’ deliberations will have a key 
role in determining the scope of the impact inventory [6].
To capture the opportunity costs from implementing an 
intervention requires consideration of what would alterna-
tively have been done with the resources if the interven-
tion had not been funded. Decision makers are not typically 
tasked with identifying specific interventions that will be 
forgone and they cannot determine which will be forgone in 
sectors outside their remit. Instead, the interest is in an esti-
mate of the value of the outcomes from activities that would 
have been funded in the absence of the specific intervention 
being considered. This information is potentially knowable, 
but generating the relevant evidence can be challenging. In 
healthcare, recent research in the UK estimated the health 
impacts of changes in spending across the National Health 
Service (NHS) budget [6, 25]. This provides an empirical 
estimate of the marginal productivity of the NHS; that is, of 
the health that will be gained or lost from marginal changes 
in spending, such as those associated with the introduction 
of new interventions or policies in the healthcare sector.5 
An extension to this work has considered which individuals 
bear the opportunity costs in terms of socioeconomic char-
acteristics and current allocation.6 Other countries are also 
undertaking work to estimate the marginal productivity of 
their healthcare expenditure [26, 27].
Table 1  Cost-effectiveness 
results for alcohol use disorder 
treatment
MM medical management, OOP out of pocket, QALY quality-adjusted life-year, QoL quality of life
MM only MM + naltrexone
A—QALYs 14.91 15.01
B—Years employed 13.86 13.9
C—Years in jail 0.55 0.53
D—Number of crimes 3 2.93
E—Number of motor vehicle accidents 0.93 0.92
F—OOP costs (alcohol and healthcare) $173 $214
G—Time costs $1014 $1091
H—Treatment costs (including OOP costs)  $474 $777
I—Lifetime healthcare expenditure (excluding treatment 
costs)
$252,464 $249,968
J—Productivity $768,450 $769,195
K—Consumption $413,103 $415,508
L—QoL impact (monetarised) $26,029 $25,338
M—Tangible costs of crime $2865 $2789
N—Criminal justice costs of crime $2640 $2570
O—Costs of incarceration $11,627 $11,168
P—Costs of motor vehicle accident $4861 $4792
Q—Legal costs (excluding QoL costs of crime) $17,132 $16,527
4 Other measures with similar characteristics include the disability-
adjusted life-year (DALY) [39] and health-adjusted life expectancy 
(HALE) [40].
5 Further research has considered non-marginal impacts [41].
6 Whilst it may not be possible ex ante to identify the individuals on 
whom the opportunity costs fall, it is possible to set out the character-
istics of the subgroups of those individuals. Similar issues exist for 
direct effects due to uncertainty about uptake and implementation and 
more generally stochastic uncertainty regarding whom among recipi-
ents of any healthcare intervention actually benefit.
 S. Walker et al.
3.2.1  Case study: the example of treatments for individuals 
with alcohol use disorders
Details of the Second Panel’s case study evaluating treat-
ments for AUDs are shown in Table 1. This shows the pub-
lished results, detailing the dimensions and costs for two 
of the strategies (medical management [MM] only and 
MM + naltrexone). Full details of what is included in each 
cost dimension are reported elsewhere [10].
To implement the framework, the relevant dimensions 
and individuals affected need first to be considered, which 
will depend on which decision maker(s) the analysis is try-
ing to inform. From a healthcare decision-making perspec-
tive, we assume the decision maker only cares about popula-
tion health. Hence, the within-patient aggregation function 
could simply be the net gain in health, which is the direct 
effect less the opportunity cost. A within-dimension aggre-
gation function is required to aggregate across patients. The 
individuals affected would be those who receive the AUD 
treatment if funded and those who forgo other types of inter-
vention as a result of the resources used to fund AUD treat-
ment not being available for other purposes (i.e. the oppor-
tunity costs).
Based on this narrow one-sector analysis, MM + nal-
trexone is dominant, generating more health (0.1 additional 
QALYs—see row A) and being less expensive (saving 
$2193—rows H and I) than MM only, and it appears that 
MM + naltrexone is worthwhile. If the additional health 
that can be generated from the cost savings was considered 
(assuming the resources are spent on healthcare7), health 
gains would be greater as the resources can be used for 
other patients. Figure 5 sets this out in terms of an impact 
inventory with the direct effect on health of the AUD patient 
and the indirect effects on health via opportunity costs on 
unknown patients. Assuming the $100,000 per QALY 
threshold used by the Second Panel represents the marginal 
productivity of the US healthcare sector, the cost savings 
would be expected to generate an additional 0.022 QALYs.
If the decision maker is willing to aggregate across indi-
viduals with AUD and the unknown patients, such that the 
health to each is valued equally, there is a total net health 
benefit (i.e. health from the intervention being introduced 
less health if it had not been) of 0.122 QALYs. It should be 
noted that the widely used $100,000 per QALY threshold for 
the USA could be seen to represent a societal willingness-
to-pay-based estimate rather than an estimate of what health 
could be produced elsewhere with the same resources based 
on the system’s marginal productivity. If the latter was lower 
at, say, $50,000 per QALY, an additional 0.044 QALYs 
would be generated for other patients [28, 29].
If health is the only dimension of interest for healthcare 
decision makers, and the aggregation method is acceptable, 
then an intervention that improves overall health should be 
approved. Alternatively, the functions could be expanded 
to consider, for example, characteristics of the individuals 
whose health is impacted and the initial level of health of 
each individual, with different weights attached to each indi-
vidual [30].
3.3  Including Other Dimensions
Health interventions may have impacts on other dimensions 
that may be considered important [24, 31]. Furthermore, 
health is not the only dimension that is of potential social 
value, otherwise all resources would be devoted to the pro-
duction of health. A broader view of what might constitute 
social value requires consideration of which dimensions are 
important.
3.3.1  Impacts Beyond Health But Only One Decision Maker: 
Health and Consumption
Impacts on individuals’ consumption of other goods are now 
considered alongside impacts on health.8 Consumption here 
relates to individuals’ purchases of goods in private markets, 
not their complete consumption of all goods and services. 
Using the impact inventory, the change in consumption of 
specific goods could be captured (e.g. the number of apples 
an individual purchases). However, a composite of change 
in total consumption using market prices may be accept-
able given that individuals determine the purchase of such 
goods, and it may be reasonable to assume that market prices 
Health (QALYs)
Individuals
Direct 
Effects
Opportunity costs
PAUD 0.1 QALYs
Punknown
$-2193 (-0.022  
QALYs)
Fig. 5  Impact inventory from a healthcare perspective captured at the 
level of the average individual with alcohol use disorders and other 
unknown individuals. AUD alcohol use disorder, Pi individual, QALY 
quality-adjusted life-year
7 For simplicity, we assume none of these costs were covered by co-
payments and have potentially different opportunity costs.
8 For example, through better health leading to improved employabil-
ity and increased earnings.
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reflect the marginal value of each good.9 The counterpart 
to consumption is productivity, which refers to the value 
of goods produced by an individual. If a new intervention 
results in an individual’s consumption increasing by more 
than the amount they produce, the excess is supported by 
the increased production or forgone consumption of other 
individuals.
The effect of forgone healthcare interventions on con-
sumption and productivity also needs to be considered, and 
these opportunity costs could be estimated using the mar-
ginal productivity of the healthcare sector for consumption 
and productivity (that is, for all the dimensions of interest, 
an estimate should be generated of what the opportunity 
cost will be on that dimension for each sector). A stylized 
example of the evaluation of a healthcare intervention with 
impacts on health and consumption is presented in Section 
A1.2 of the supplementary material.
3.3.2  Application to the Case Study
Figure 6 considers the impacts on the dimensions of health 
and consumption of the AUD intervention. The impact 
of healthcare on health remains the same as in Sect. 3.2. 
There is a gain in individuals’ consumption of $2287 from 
MM + naltrexone compared with MM only (where consump-
tion includes the effect on the AUD patients’ time valued 
monetarily and on out-of-pocket costs—rows F, G and K). 
However, as a result of a smaller increase in the individ-
ual’s productivity (only $745—row J), there is a negative 
net production effect (change in individual’s production less 
their change in consumption) such that other individuals 
 (Punkown2) would have to forgo $1660 of consumption to fund 
the AUD patients’ additional consumption. As such, with 
MM + naltrexone, there is a gain in health and consump-
tion to the AUD patients, a gain in health to other unknown 
patients10 and a loss of consumption to another group of 
unknown individuals.
If both health and consumption are important to the deci-
sion maker (e.g. for a local area public health decision maker 
whose mandate extended to include individual consump-
tion), a means of comparison of the health and consumption 
gained and forgone is required. Either approach to aggrega-
tion (within dimension or within individual) requires a nor-
mative judgement on how to value the two dimensions rela-
tive to one another, i.e. the value of a unit of health relative 
to consumption ( v
h
).11 This could be based, for example, on 
the willingness to pay for health of a sample of the general 
population, or each individual’s willingness to pay. If we 
take a within-dimension approach where the decision maker 
is indifferent to whom the health and consumption accrues, 
there is a net health gain of 0.122 or 0.144 QALYs (based 
on a $100,000 or $50,000 per QALY marginal productivity, 
respectively) and a net consumption gain of $627 (gain to 
 PAUD less forgone consumption for Punknown2 to fund it) gen-
erated by MM + naltrexone compared with MM only. If the 
willingness to trade health for consumption is $100,000 per 
QALY, there is a total net gain in monetary value of $11,573 
(or $13,773). This could alternatively be expressed in terms 
of health of 0.11573 QALYs (or 0.13773 QALYs).
3.3.3  Extending to Three Dimensions and Two Sectors 
with Two Separate Decision Makers
Previously, only one sector and one decision maker have 
been considered. Criminal justice can be considered another 
sector for which government takes responsibility for the allo-
cation of resources. There are many potential objectives set 
in the criminal justice system, for example, recidivism rates 
for probationary services or crime levels for police forces. 
It could be considered that the ultimate aim is to reduce the 
level of crime faced by individuals in society. In criminal 
justice, unlike in health with QALYs, there is currently no 
established generic measure to capture crime reduction (and 
all its wider benefits) that would allow consistent compari-
son across policies. This complicates analyses even when 
restricted to consideration of criminal justice effects only, 
let alone when wider impacts are considered. However, for 
a basic analysis, it may be appropriate to use the number of 
crimes as the relevant dimension for the criminal justice sec-
tor. Opportunity costs will also need to be estimated, based 
on the costs to each sector and the marginal productivities 
of each sector for each outcome.
Health (QALYs) Consumpon
DE OC DE OC
In
d
iv
id
u
a
ls PAUD 0.1 $2,287
Punknown1
-$2193 (-
0.022QALYs)
Punknown2 $1,660
Fig. 6  Impact inventory incorporating consumption impact captured 
at the level of the average individual with alcohol use disorders and 
other unknown individuals. AUD alcohol use disorder, DE direct 
effect, OC opportunity cost, Pi individual, QALY quality-adjusted 
life-year
9 If this is contentious, as it is felt that prices may not reflect value, 
for example due to market failure, it may be desirable to capture the 
impact on each good separately (as dimensions of the inventory), or 
alternatively to use other estimates of value to aggregate them.
10 We assume, for simplicity, that this does not impact their con-
sumption, although if there is also an important change in their con-
sumption, this should also be estimated.
11 This gives the value of a unit of health in terms of units of con-
sumption. Consumption is simply being used as the common numer-
aire; it is equally possible to convert consumption into health or both 
dimensions into another numeraire.
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Whether the introduction of the intervention is worth-
while requires consideration of the objectives of the two 
decision makers involved (i.e. those relating to healthcare 
and criminal justice). If there are positive net benefits in 
health, criminal justice and consumption, there would be 
no conflicts, and decision makers in both sectors would 
consider the introduction of the intervention to be worth-
while regardless of their weights for the different dimen-
sions. However, in the case of losses in one or two sectors 
from health, criminal justice or consumption, a method for 
aggregation is required. As with health and consumption, a 
means of valuing these on a common metric is required. This 
could be in terms of the consumption value for the outcome 
of the criminal justice sector ( vj ). If this is not known, then 
a reasonable initial proxy may be to consider that the alloca-
tion of the budgets in society is such that the value of a unit 
of currency spent in either health or criminal justice is the 
same in terms of its consumption value.12
The use of this framework to make relevant trade-offs 
explicit does not, of course, guarantee that it will be possi-
ble to get consensus between the different decision makers 
on the method for aggregation and the values used. When 
decision makers have different objectives or relative valu-
ations of objectives, the net benefit may look different to 
each. However, by providing the evidence on the impacts 
on different outcomes, and presenting results based on dif-
ferent relative valuations, the analyst can help to inform any 
deliberations between decision makers more generally. It 
also facilitates consideration as to whether it is possible for 
one decision maker to compensate another so that there are 
gains in all dimensions [15, 32]. A stylized example of the 
evaluation of an intervention considering three dimensions 
(health, education and consumption) and involving two 
decision makers is presented in Section A1.3 of the sup-
plementary material.
3.3.4  Application to the Case Study
Expanding the previous case study also to consider criminal 
justice, MM + naltrexone compared with MM only results 
in fewer crimes and, therefore, fewer years in jail, lower 
tangible costs of crime, lower criminal justice costs, lower 
incarceration costs and lower monetarised quality-of-life 
impacts of crime. A challenge here is that, as presented by 
the Second Panel, many of these costs do not fall on the 
same decision makers or individuals. For example, the tan-
gible costs of crime include the costs of healthcare, other 
public sector activities and property damage, each of which 
falls on different decision makers and budgets. The Second 
Panel made a judgement that it is acceptable to aggregate 
all these into a single dimension (tangible costs of crime). 
This could raise issues, for example, if the opportunity costs 
of resources for each budget differs or if different decision 
makers involved have different views of the value of costs 
falling on those budgets.
An alternative approach is shown in Fig. 7, which sepa-
rates the quality-of-life impacts on victims (who are poten-
tially known) from all other ‘legal costs’ (tangible costs of 
crime, incarceration costs, motor vehicle costs13). MM + nal-
trexone results in direct effects on quality-of-life impacts on 
victims from crime, which when monetised are equivalent to 
savings of $691 (row k) to the victims of the AUD patients 
(Pvictim—with 0.07 crimes averted—row D) and further legal 
cost savings of $605 (row Q, or sum of rows M, N and O). 
A ‘criminal justice’ decision maker may be interested in 
how many crimes are averted. Directly, 0.07 crimes were 
averted, but if those freed ‘legal’ resources could also be 
used to avert crimes, some measure of the productivity of 
those budgets would be required to estimate the total number 
Fig. 7  Impact inventory 
incorporating criminal justice 
captured at the level of the aver-
age individual with alcohol use 
disorders and other unknown 
individuals. AUD alcohol use 
disorder, DE direct effect, OC 
opportunity cost, Pi individual, 
QALY quality-adjusted life-year
Health (QALYs) Consumpon Criminal jusce
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PAUD 0.1 $2287
Punknown1
-$2193 (-
0.022QALYs)
Punknown2 $1660
Pvicm
$-691(  -
0.07 
crimes)
Punknown3
$605 ( 
impact on 
other 
crimes?)
13 We have incorporated motor vehicle costs into criminal justice for 
simplicity.
12 Based on the assumption that public sector budgets are set such 
that the ratio of the consumption value of the unit of outcome and the 
marginal productivity of the sector for that unit is the same across 
sectors 
v
h
k
h
=
v
e
k
e
 . Initially this may be inaccurate, but as more evalua-
tions are conducted more information is produced that could be 
applied to inform sector allocations.
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of crimes averted (e.g. a marginal productivity of the crimi-
nal justice system). Alternatively, it may be considered rea-
sonable simply to aggregate the monetarised quality-of-life 
impact from victims with the other legal costs falling across 
a range of sectors (the approach taken by the Second Panel, 
resulting in total legal cost savings of $1296—rows L and 
Q). Careful consideration now needs to be given to how to 
aggregate these. One approach is aggregation across out-
comes for each individual affected and then across individu-
als (a within-individual approach). This would require the 
identification of each individual and the impacts on their 
health, consumption and crimes. Alternatively, methods for 
aggregation within dimension could be considered (e.g. how 
many QALYs are generated, how much additional consump-
tion is generated, etc.). Each approach involves a series of 
normative judgements.
Finally, it is worth considering the approach taken by the 
Second Panel. They considered it appropriate to aggregate 
costs and all dimensions captured monetarily (everything 
excluding health), to estimate a ‘societal cost’ of the inter-
ventions. These were then compared with the health gain 
based on a ‘cost-effectiveness threshold’ of $100,000 per 
QALY. Using such an approach, MM + naltrexone results in 
0.1 QALY gain and cost savings of $1898, resulting in a total 
net monetary benefit of $11,898. This approach involves a 
number of strong value judgements and assumptions. For 
example, that the opportunity costs falling on all budgets are 
assumed to be the same, that all other dimensions can appro-
priately be captured monetarily and that there is indifference 
with respect to the individuals upon whom the direct effects 
and opportunity costs fall. These judgements and assump-
tions may be considered acceptable, but the analyst should 
make these explicit and identify possible alternatives. The 
impact inventory proposed here should make these judge-
ments more transparent.
4  Discussion
Economic evaluations are used to inform decisions across 
different settings that can have very different institutional 
arrangements. The contribution of this paper is to address 
collaborative or shared decision making where policies 
affect resources and outcomes across multiple independent 
decision makers with different objectives and responsibili-
ties. This framework describes both how economic evalua-
tion can inform these decision makers and how to conceptu-
alise a societal perspective by identifying which dimensions 
require trade-offs to resolve differences between decision 
makers. It seeks to remain neutral with respect to the nor-
mative considerations inherent in all forms of economic 
evaluation and the form of economic evaluation, aiming to 
distinguish the points at which value judgements feed into 
the evaluation process and the implications of alternative 
judgements where possible.14
The framework proposed here can be seen as a broader, 
extended version of the ‘impact inventory’ suggested by the 
Second Panel [10]. It obliges the inclusion of opportunity 
costs, which are not explicit in the Panel’s approach. The 
approach here makes explicit relevant normative judge-
ments, whereas the Second Panel arguably imposes a spe-
cific aggregation function within dimension, whereby all 
individuals are valued equally and across dimensions and 
where all non-health dimensions (e.g. quality-of-life impacts 
of crime) can be captured monetarily and aggregated with 
costs.
The range of alternative normative principles that can 
help to define social value have been extensively researched 
and are inevitably contested. Two broad normative frame-
works that underlie the economic evaluation of healthcare 
interventions are welfarism and extra-welfarism [33]. Wel-
farism states that social welfare is a function of individual 
utility and, therefore, would require a within-individual eval-
uation within the framework presented here. Extra welfarism 
is compatible with both within-individual and within-dimen-
sion approaches. Either way, to define social value using an 
explicit social welfare function defined across individuals 
and dimensions requires that the full set of dimensions and 
the methods for aggregation be defined ex ante. For this to 
be useful for decision makers, each would have to agree 
that the function is appropriate and that they will follow its 
implications for policy. This is likely to be challenging given 
the many conflicting and contradictory claims on what is 
socially valuable.
The framework can be used across different forms of 
economic evaluation such as cost-effectiveness analysis 
or cost–benefit analysis. Other approaches proposed for 
the evaluation of policies with wide impacts include social 
rate of return [34], universal outcome measures [35] and 
multicriteria decision analysis [36], but there is generally 
a particular set of value judgements implicit in each. For 
example, the social rate of return analysis aggregates across 
all dimensions using monetary values, the source of which 
may be contestable, and often ignores opportunity costs in 
different sectors. The universal outcome measure approach 
uses an outcome taken as relevant across all sectors (e.g. 
well-being) and assumes the underlying dimensions and 
their relative values are known and accepted by all.
14 Some judgements, such as the choice of dimensions, may need to 
be made ex ante, and it will not be possible to consider the implica-
tions of, for example, a wider set of dimensions than those originally 
considered.
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The extended impact inventory presented here empha-
sises the importance of a disaggregated presentation of costs, 
effects and opportunity costs by dimension. The framework 
shows the changes in relevant dimensions from an interven-
tion, and how the subsequent application of values estab-
lishes whether the intervention is worthwhile. Whose val-
ues should be used for this purpose is, of course, a political 
question. Some may wish to be prescriptive about this by, for 
example, specifying the rate at which health should be traded 
for education, thus defining a (partial) social value function. 
The basis of the applied examples presented in this paper can 
be considered consistent with the ‘social decision-making 
approach’ which aims to consider how society establishes 
processes to balance conflicting and contradictory claims on 
what is valuable [5, 37]. The implications of this process in 
terms, for example, of the current trade-offs between health 
and education and the budgets made available to decision 
makers, can be seen as providing a partial but legitimate 
expression of some unknown underlying social value func-
tion [38]. Even if it is felt that the current budgetary alloca-
tion does not accurately reflect societal values, it determines 
the opportunity costs.
Given the objectives and responsibilities of different insti-
tutions, it can be regarded as acceptable that public sec-
tor decision makers determine the values to apply or their 
source (e.g. the preferences of a sample of the public). Some 
decision-making organisations have publicly defined their 
preferred approaches with ‘methods guidelines’ (e.g. drug 
reimbursement authorities internationally). Where this is not 
the case, it may be helpful to start with a ‘base-case’ set of 
value judgements that reflect those used in similar exercises 
for the relevant organisations, and this reflects the approach 
taken in the case study here. Importantly, however, the value 
judgements in the base case need to be explicit, alternatives 
made available and their importance to overall conclusions 
made clear. By providing the evidence on the impacts on 
different dimensions, and presenting results based on a range 
of valuations, the analyst can help to inform deliberations 
between decision makers responsible for different sectors. 
This contrasts with the implicit value judgements taken in 
many economic evaluations, particularly those claiming to 
be taking a ‘societal perspective’.
Furthermore, by making decision makers’ value judge-
ments explicit, future evaluations for the same decision 
makers can apply those as one approach to valuation and 
aggregation while assessing the impact of others. This has 
implications for the practicality of using the framework, 
making it consistent and easier to implement over time. 
Even where a particular decision maker has no interest 
in the consequences of their choices on other dimen-
sions, by presenting the full range of evidence across all 
affected parties the analyst has shown the trade-offs and, 
therefore, the implications of the decision maker’s limited 
view. A deliberative decision-making process can, there-
fore, be informed, and potentially held accountable by an 
explicitly partial analysis capturing the major dimensions 
impacted upon. The results from this partial approach may 
also be valuable to inform budget reallocation negotiations 
by highlighting any discrepancy in marginal productivity 
across sectors and the budget transfers that this implies.
Achieving consensus in the dimensions considered 
socially valuable, and their relative values, may be an 
impossible task. However, decisions still need to be made, 
and by offering assessments of the impacts (the direct 
benefits and opportunity costs) on those dimensions that 
are considered most important, the analyst can help to 
inform these decisions through quantitative analysis. This 
approach also allows for the consideration of potential 
transfers between decision makers to compensate win-
ners and losers. These analyses provide a strong basis for 
assessing the value of new policies.
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